Using multiple data sources, a preparedness measurement methodology has been developed for evaluation and application in the communities of Sikeston, Missouri, and Carbondale, Illinois. The evaluation and comparison of disaster preparedness, as well as disaster response, across different communities has long been a difficult task, and this effort seeks to address the need to move the discussion forward. This study utilized several data sources, including: 1) a survey of essential facility managers in the two communities; 2) document data extracted from the two city's Comprehensive Plans, Budgets, and the Emergency Operation Plans; and 3) key informant interviews. The key conclusions are first, that a preparedness model has the potential to assist in the comparison and evaluation of community preparedness, but needs additional refinement, calibration, and applied testing. Second, in terms of future research, this type of effort is preliminary, and needs to be tested across a larger number of communities to gauge its accuracy, and would most benefit from the creation of consistent baseline scores for a larger cross section of communities. Baseline scores could be examined for disasters that affect multiple communities, and comparison and evaluations of the preparedness measures can be applied. Future research should calibrate the model using expert and community feedback.
Introduction
This paper describes the development of a preparedness measurement methodology developed using two test communities: Sikeston, Missouri and Carbondale, Illinois. The development of these measures is designed to assist decision makers in the evaluation of the relative state of disaster preparedness in their communities. The information will provide a means of evaluation of current efforts at a community level, and would be best applied across multiple communities to allow cross comparisons.
The research objective is to work toward, and in part operationalize, a well-established theoretical construct in the natural hazards and emergency management fields, namely; that a disaster occurs when the demands on the system are greater than the capabilities of the community to meet them. While the concept is easily understood, the operationalization is more difficult.
Events in the U.S. have made the evaluation and comparison of community-wide disaster preparedness a much-needed methodology. In addition to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , there has been a longer list of natural hazard events, such as the large-scale disaster experiences of communities in Hurricane Andrew (1992) , the Northridge Earthquake (1994) , and the flooding of the Mississippi River (1993) . More as a result of the natural events, the insurance industry is seeking methods of policy pricing that more accurately capture the actual risk for a given area. In practical terms, a community disaster preparedness index would provide a utility similar to the Insurance Service Office (ISO) rating, which classifies a community with regard to its fire fighting and response capabilities. A similar rating exists with the National Flood Insurance Program's (NFIP) Community Rating System (CRS), which assigns policy credits based on a community's CRS score. A preparedness score, however, would seek to be more comprehensive, and allow cities of varying size and composition to be compared one to another.
More importantly, a standardized preparedness measure could help fill a missing link in the adoption of local hazard mitigation policies and activities, by providing the potential for market and political forces acting to increase mitigation activity. Emergency managers and related organizations would be able to utilize scores as a means of performing a preparedness and resiliency audit for their communities. Low scores could provide incentive to improve the community's capabilities, particularly if the ranking meant an associated fiscal impact in terms of insurance provision. There would also be a potential link between the competitive allocation of federal funding for recovery funds based on preparedness scores.
The Research Problem and Context
The research problem is the identification, measurement, and compilation of appropriate preparedness indicators for the creation of a community preparedness score. In creating the score, it is also necessary to create a theoretical model for the collection of data and application of appropriate weights to the variety of measures used. While this effort is an attempt to move farther along that path, it will be necessary to apply an expanded model to a larger set of communities to arrive at a grounded, valid, and useable process that accurately reflects the conditions in the community. Moving forward to a testable model would involve a secondary research process that would incorporate expert panel input, additional surveys, and application to a larger set of communities.
Perhaps the issue is best illustrated by a simple question: Q: Which city is more prepared for a disaster: Detroit, Michigan or San Antonio, Texas? A: We don't know.
The creation of a preparedness measure deals with some of the most fundamental aspects of disaster research such as "What is a disaster?" or "How do we know a community is prepared?"
To understand the nature of a disaster, one must first be able to define it. Quarantelli (1982:457) addresses this issue by stating there are "at least seven different major ways in which disasters have been either implicitly or explicitly conceptualized." Those methods deal with several important constructs, such as disaster agents, impacts, social disruption, political framing of the event, and others.
Disaster Demands versus Community Capabilities
One method of defining a disaster is based on the notion that a disaster is only a "disaster" if the demands created by the event exceed the community's capacity for dealing with it. Quarantelli calls this an "imbalance in the demand-capability ratio in a crisis situation" (Quarantelli 1982:464) . The idea of examining formal organizations with respect to extreme stress situations can be traced back to the work of Barton (1969) and Drabek and Haas (1970) .
Other notable researchers have also considered the framing of a disaster as a crisis state, or social stressor. Wenger (1978) in particular, first articulated that the impact of a disaster agent is not a sufficient enough characteristic to determine whether a disaster has occurred. Wenger states that "[i]n addition, one must consider the degree of crisis management capability in the community" (Wenger 1978:28) . Because the community resources, commitment to preparedness, and other factors influence the ability to respond to disaster impacts, Wenger goes on to say that:
[I]t is possible that given two different communities, one with extensive crisis management mechanisms and the other with few such resources, disaster agents with similar characteristics may produce a crisis in the latter system, but only an emergency in the former (Wenger op cit).
While the "demands exceeding capabilities" proposition makes intuitive sense, it has not thus far been operationalized or empirically tested.
Defining Community Capabilities
The use and validity of indicators to measure social phenomena (de Neufville 1975) , predict urban organizational behavior (Clark and Wilson 1994) , or even identify similarities and differences among communities (Colley 1975; Moberg 1979; Murphy 1980 ) is a source of continual debate among social scientists. The same can be said about the attempts to conceptualize, measure, or otherwise identify the capacity of local community for disaster response or recovery.
The model described in sections below draws from Quarantelli, Wenger, and others to identify the functional elements for assessing a community's disaster preparedness and response
capabilities. An inductive approach generates an initial model of measurement indicators. Those indicators would then, in later research phases, be narrowed through factor analysis, and then refined with expert input and feedback from other sources.
The City as Unit of Analysis
It is important to note that the primary responsibility for preparedness planning and response originates with the local community, and in most cases, is the municipality or city.
Ordinance making authority, police power, and general regulatory issues that face a community are typically addressed through the city council. While there are external forces that influence the adoption of some community mitigation actions over others (Mileti 1980 , May 1996 , the city still has the preponderance of authority for preparedness activity, and for this primary reason is the unit of analysis. It is recognized that disasters are inherently regional, and that an argument can be made for analyzing the region by considering its "economic" watershed, rather than political boundaries. Those and similar considerations are recommended for future research.
Criteria for Evaluating Preparedness
There has been some work toward the development of criteria for assessing the preparedness of a community, although it is in broad generic terms. Quarantelli describes the need to use a basic set of criteria to encourage communities to be more proactive in their emergency preparedness efforts and identifies a number of specific criteria for evaluating and assessing disaster preparedness and planning (Quarantelli 1987 (Quarantelli , 1994 . Those criteria, as aspects of preparedness planning and process, often do have measurable outputs. As an example, disaster planning includes drills and exercises--therefore some measurable outputs would be number of drills held, number of participants, amount of media coverage, and similar data.
Wenger also has identified factors and functional components at the local level that influence the shaping of community capacity. Among others factors, Wenger and Drabek note that: "Community size and the existence of local disaster events are two critical factors that shape local response capability. In general, the greater the size of the community and the more extensive its disaster experience, the more viable is the local response system" (Wenger and Drabek, 1987: 18) .
National Perspectives and Hazard Policies
Mattingly, when discussing the NFIP, points out that the national mood has been "calling for more accountability in the way government spends money and an ever shrinking funding pool…" (Mattingly 1996:12) . The funding environment has created a more performance-based perspective on hazards mitigation. There is not, however, a reliable means of measuring or linking accountability at the local level to consistently applied cost-benefit, or similar analytical tools, in allocating disaster preparedness or recovery funds.
Simultaneously, there is a general rise in the desire for more performance-based evaluations and perspectives on hazard mitigation. Examples at the federal level have been seen with former-FEMA Director James Lee Witt, and the increased emphasis on mitigation and the need for more cooperative public/private activity (Project Impact), as well as the desire to measure readiness through performance partnership agreements, or PPAs (Witt 1997) .
Beyond simply the engaging theoretical implications of quantifying community capabilities, there has also been a more practical drive for creating standardized measurements of community preparedness and response capabilities. The impetus has emerged from the insurance industry's need to more accurately capture and identify the risk for specific geographic areas, and then be able to price insurance portfolios and individual policies accordingly. This desire, combined with the experiences of the large-scale disasters of the 1990s, has created more discussion regarding the creation of "all-peril" or "all-hazards insurance" first proposed in 1969 by Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) as a risk pooling method.
These factors lead to a converging consensus regarding the need for theoretical development using a more comprehensive perspective on hazard mitigation and the ability to make meaningful judgments about a community's progress toward more effective emergency preparedness. The consensus can be seen in other elements of national dialog. For example, we have seen a rise in the use of terms such as Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment, which FEMA has called its "cornerstone of the National Mitigation Strategy" (FEMA 1997b), or "All Hazards" as a concept for risk pricing for insurance portfolios. In the recent past we have also seen the emergence of the term "Disaster Resistant Communities" (or Disaster "Resilient" Communities) to signify a community's efforts to be more prepared for, and more able to respond to, a disaster event. FEMA's program to showcase community preparedness (with federal assistance) in the form of "Project Impact" was intended to show the gains that could be made through cross-sector public-private coordination and cooperation in the pre-event, or preparedness phases before a disaster.
These national trends have occurred without a concomitant development in the manner in which success of these efforts can be measured. For example, how can a community claim, or even guess, that their commitment to "Project Impact" has actually made any difference in their preparedness and recovery capabilities? How does a city know when it has become "resistant" to a possible disaster? We don not have an answer or an adequate method for evaluating generic preparedness across communities, nor can we compare the relative successes/failures of new federal initiatives that seek, as an output, increased disaster preparedness.
Rating Systems in Hazards (ISO, CRS, and CGES)
There are examples of specific rating systems in the hazards field, as briefly discussed here. They are found wanting for broader comparative purposes, however, because they tend to focus on a particular hazard agent, or the specific activities to prevent damage of structures in the anticipation of a specific event, such as a fire or flood. Further, the evaluation and use of standardized rating systems for either fire (ISO ratings) or floods (CRS ratings) are not well addressed in hazards literature. While ISO ratings have been in place over fifty years, their accuracy and representativeness of community fire fighting capabilities have not been systematically examined. The overall impact of those ratings has also not been researched, even though the ratings can affect insurance rates for a given community.
The National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System is a more recent application of a rating system to encourage hazard mitigation activity. Instituted in 1991, it offers potential credits of policies (up to 45%) based on the amount of mitigation activity that a community undertakes. The CRS system and its effects are still not clearly understood in the literature. First, limited systemic analysis has been done of the rating system. Second, with respect to the total number of communities that could qualify, relatively few have been through the process. As of May 2004, the NFIP reports approximately 1000 communities participating in the CRS rating system. Of those, most are at the low end of the ranking qualifying for the minimum 5% reduction in premiums. In a recent examination of the NFIP, Kunreuther and White's (1994) first recommendation is a call for a more intensive evaluation of the CRS, in order to better understand its effects and how the system can be improved.
While the effects are not yet fully understood, the use of such indices has become an accepted means of comparing certain aspects of these communities, and as a way to link the pricing of insurance more directly to the risk in a given area. A third and new rating scale has been developed by the ISO in conjunction with the building industry that rates a community's "Building Code Effectiveness" (ISO 1995) . The Code Enforcement Grading System (CEGS) was a direct result of the damage experienced in Hurricane Andrew (1992) in which damage was experienced as a result insufficient building code enforcement. To date there have been no comprehensive evaluations of the CEGS.
State-Level Assessments of Readiness-The CAR
The most recent attempt to use ratings as a means of measurement and furthering a policy goal--in this case increased preparedness--has been seen with the introduction of FEMA's State Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR) program. The CAR was designed to measure progress of the FEMA Performance Partnership Agreements (PPAs) initiated in 1995. The CAR asks states to score themselves on 13 emergency management functions (EMFs), such as planning, communications, logistics, and others, specifically to "examine operational readiness and capabilities of the Federal/State emergency management partnership to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from, emergencies and disasters" (FEMA 1997a: 1).
There are two issues at stake with the CAR that make it a less than desirable model. The first issue is that the CAR is designed to measure state-level capabilities, and has not yet been applied at the local level. The second and more important issue is methodological. The CAR is a self-report data collection system. States are asked to do a self-assessment regarding their readiness for a disaster. The reporting scale is based on three broad ranges of 1) Needs improvement; 2) Meets criteria; and 3) Identified strength. Not surprisingly, when the CAR was first conducted in 1997, the average scores for all states fell within the middle range of "meets criteria" (FEMA 1997a: 8) . There are clearly disincentives for states to be either too self-critical, or too self-congratulatory. Too critical, and it might draw the negative attention of FEMA officials; too congratulatory, and it might mean a reduction in financial support, or even a reduction in post disaster funding.
Research Design
The research design for this project consisted of four phases: a literature review, model development, survey, and a documents analysis process. The research was conducted between 1998 and 2000. The literature review was targeted to sources related specifically to essential facilities, as well as searching for potential sources of parallel models or related applications.
Based on the literature, prior experience of the researcher, and a pilot project conducted at the Hazard Reduction and Recovery Center at Texas A&M University in 1998, a model was developed that would use indicator data to create a scoring system for evaluating community preparedness.
The survey was performed using the population of Essential Facility managers in the selected case communities of Sikeston and Carbondale. The survey was designed to evaluate their preparedness activity and behavior with respect to decision-making in a risk prone environment (earthquake). This particular population was selected and determined by both the funding agency needs (Mid America Earthquake Center), and the work of other researchers on parallel projects in the Center.
The documents analysis involved collecting, examining, and extracting the appropriate indicator information. Documents collected for the communities included the most recent available comprehensive plan, budget, and emergency operations plans. Other information was also obtained through the use of key informant interviews, posted website data, and other sources. The next sections describe in more detail the model development, survey, and community indictor development.
Selection of Communities
One might ask, why use Sikeston and Carbondale as the test communities for this research? This project was part of a larger collaborative effort in the MidAmerica Earthquake (MAE) Center, one of three national earthquake engineering research centers in the U.S., that was searching for a small set of pilot communities in which to conduct a series of research projects on essential facilities and infrastructure in the Mid-America region. The MAE Center decided to use the same two communities across the range of projects in order to create a standardized test bed.
Among other considerations, it was understood that the two communities would exemplify some of the following characteristics: larger versus smaller; more emergency resources versus fewer; a community that had taken some degree of earthquake mitigation activity versus a community that had not; and a city with a more earthquake awareness versus one with less, or none.
The selection of the two communities used the following procedure. Nominations were first sought through the Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC), then discussed with the State Emergency Management officials in Illinois and Missouri, and finally with officials in the communities themselves. Carbondale was selected in part because of its relatively proactive stance on earthquake preparedness activity. For example the community was selected as a FEMA Project Impact Community in 1997. Sikeston expressed willingness to participate, although it has done little in the way of community-wide earthquake preparedness. The community is located close to the New Madrid Fault zone, and is therefore at greater risk to potential damage from a New Madrid Earthquake event. Both communities were thought to be generally representative of a large proportion of communities in the Mid-America region states.
An Initial Definition of Essential Facilities

As described in the Essential Facilities program section of the MidAmerica Earthquake
Center, the following definition of Essential Facilities states that they were considered those buildings that support functions related to post-earthquake emergency response and disaster management. These include emergency management centers, police and fire stations, hospitals, potential shelters (including school buildings), and buildings that house emergency services (French and Olshansky 2001).
It is further stated that this definition applies only to the first segment of projects, and that commercial and industrial facilities would be considered in future research.
Model development
The formulation of a cross-comparative measure is a difficult task. The examples of ISO ratings and NFIP CRS ratings show some success for a hazard specific scenario, but stop short of looking comprehensively at a community. Using the following major categories, an initial model was developed based on measures that: a) related to disaster preparedness or response capability; and b) could feasibly be gathered in a pilot project context. The model is shown graphically in A more detailed category list is in the next table, followed by a brief description of the weighting and scoring rationale for the selected items. 
PM = 3(A+B+C) + 2(D) + 3(E) + 3(F) + G + (-)H + 3(I) + J
Additional weight was assigned to those functions that involve specific disaster preparedness activity, and the availability of existing infrastructure, either in the form of personnel or equipment. It is fully recognized that this is not a complete indicator list, nor is it yet calibrated.
Due to the nature of building a scoring system with dissimilar scales and items for comparison, a standardization process was applied where necessary to bring scores within an ordinal range that made comparison feasible. Operations were performed equally on each city's data, the goal being to tame large effects caused by larger numbers.
The scoring system is shown in its applied form in Table 2 below. The common method of standardizing many of the data points was to examine the number value on a per capita basis.
Data for the model was obtained through the General Plans of the two communities, the City
Budgets, the Emergency Operation Plans, and interviews with key informants in the two cities.
In order to make application of this model easier in the future, it will help to identify as many secondary data sources as possible to fill in the indicators. Experience with this population has shown that primary data collection, unless done in a site visit, is extremely difficult and not cost effective. In some cases, multiple phone calls remained unanswered, and promised information never sent.
Initial Rationale for Weighting
As indicated in the preceding section, the following functional areas were identified: Items "A" through "J" were then examined as to their role and function, based on historical and theoretical expectations regarding community functioning under disaster conditions. They were then grouped and weighted to reflect the equation introduced in the prior section:
PM = 3(A+B+C) + 2(D) + 3(E) + 3(F) + G + (-) H + 3(I) + J
Category items "A," "B," and "C" were grouped together because "emergency response" can be thought of as the combined resources of the fire, emergency medical, and police capabilities of a community. The remaining functions were left independent. The weighting decision was based on a very broad basis, using factors of one, two and three to represent the relative importance of the function within the overall community profile.
Items "G" (additional community measures), "H" (hazard exposure), and "J" (community resiliency) were considered neutral, meaning the sub score was multiplied by one. The exposure sub score was actually a negative "(-)H" because it represented a higher risk to the community, and therefore would lead one to expect that the community would need to be that much more prepared.
Item "D" (planning and zoning) applied a factor of two because of the estimate that has been widely promoted by FEMA, in which the claim is made: "FEMA estimates that for every dollar spent in damage prevention, two are saved in repairs." (FEMA Website 2000) . Planning and zoning is the only category in this model that has mitigation components.
The combined emergency response items ("A,B,C"), as well as items "E" (emergency services office), "F" (other emergency functions), and "I" (evacuation and warnings), were all given a weighting factor of three because these four main functional areas tend to be the core disaster and emergency response activities within any community. A more careful calibration might determine additional differential weightings, but these were utilized to perform a first test of the model. Using a normalization of Z scores, followed by factor and then sensitivity analysis, would offer more rigor in the analysis of a larger group of cities. Without a larger sample population, the test case for these two communities is difficult to assess.
The numbers do, however, indicate an intuitive correlation with the known preparedness activity and sub-cultures of the two communities. Under the construct derived here, the scores would indicate that Carbondale is approximately 33% more prepared than Sikeston. Or another way of stating it might be that Sikeston has about 2/3 the preparedness capacity than that of Carbondale.
These statements appear to reflect overall resources in the two communities. However, given this small case, it is not possible to say if this would hold true across a larger set of communities.
Discussion
This has been a first step in the conceptualization of creating a Preparedness Measure for communities. It is clear that much research is needed in this area. It is also clear that the hazard community could benefit from the creation of such a measurement methodology. One of the key factors will to consider how these measurement attempts might be utilized. There are a number of ways in which a more fully explicated preparedness model might assist in the general disaster preparedness efforts in local communities. Five are listed here, and include the use of such a methodology for 1) a research instrument; 2) a community preparedness and recovery audit or assessment; 3) a risk pricing instrument for the insurance industry; 4) an instrument for the allocation of federal funding, both for mitigation and recovery activities; and 5) a political instrument.
1. Research potential and applications. An expanded Preparedness Index model would have multiple applications in the area of hazards research. For the first time, questions that ask, "Is community 'x' actually more prepared than community 'y'?" may have a reasonably clear answer. That answer is hinted at in the results presented in this project. A more definitive answer will be found in the ability to more concretely and objectively specify a community's capabilities and preparedness--looking at those measures before a disaster, and completing comparative analysis regarding how a class of communities, with those characteristics, fare in a disaster. The question might be asked: "Is it safer to live in community 'y' than community 'z' for certain hazards?" Similar types of comparative analysis would be possible. These questions are difficult, at best, to answer with the current state of measurement in the field. Having baseline measures that can be compared over time will allow a wide range of research analysis that looks at variations in political systems, community characteristics, or help understand exogenous policy effects or direct interventions within the community's governmental system. In other research contexts, the model could be used to examine differences in regions, differences among communities with exposures to different hazards, and differences within communities with respect to the allocation of resources for emergency preparedness and recovery activity.
In addition to the comparison of communities to one another, the model could be used as a predictor (within orders of magnitude) of the ability of differently ranked communities to recover from an incident. Additionally, the model could be applied retroactively, to the extent historical data is available. This process, if done in a broad enough context, would assist in the calibration of the model and increase its validity, and its accuracy as a potential predictor of future impacts. There is also a tremendous potential to combine this model with a Geographic Information System (GIS), or other hazard mapping process. Follow-on research would seek to validate and refine the model so that it best captures the measurement of community system capabilities, providing a reference point for understanding when, why, and how those capabilities are exceeded.
2. Creating a community preparedness and recovery audit. By creating an expanded and standardized means of measuring and assessing preparedness, and evaluating the potential for recovery, a Preparedness Index could be utilized by city administrators to gauge the progress of mitigation and preparedness activity. The results would be of interest to the city manager, and particularly the emergency preparedness officials. The Local Emergency Preparedness Committee (LEPC) would find it useful in their oversight of the community's activities. Lastly, community-based preparedness groups could also use it in their efforts to promote activity in their community.
3. Instrument for insurance policy pricing. There has been substantial discussion of the need for insurance carriers to be able to better allocate the risk for individual policies. The process currently takes place in the forms of ISO and CRS scores for community fire-fighting and floodproofing. The Preparedness Measures model takes the rating one step further, creating a rating that is more inclusive, and is more in line with the concept of an "all hazards" policy, but one that appropriately considers the preparedness and response capability of the local community.
4. Instrument for federal funding decisions. The index score could be used as a means of allocating federal funding, either for preparedness, recovery, or both. FEMA has faced criticism for its allocation of funds in the past, both in terms of recovery and mitigation. Funds are often distributed irrespective of the community behavior and dedication to better preparedness. An index score could be linked to the availability of funding for these communities.
5. Potential as a political/economic force. If a preparedness index score becomes a basis for determining the insurance rates for a community, there is the potential for the score to have real political and economic power. The effect of a low rating would mean the increase of commercial insurance rates, which in turn could mean a negative impact on economic development and business recruitment and retention. Applied to homeowners insurance, the low ratings would mean higher home prices, and a potential negative impact on the residential building and growth of the community. These negative effects would likely result in political pressures on the part of the elected officials to change the ratings, and thus there is pressure from the top of the system for hazard mitigation, rather than just from the emergency management officials. Elected officials would likely receive pressure from organized preparedness groups in the community that would use a preparedness index as a measuring stick for the political activism in this area.
Concluding Thoughts
There is ample room for improvement in the manner in which we assess the vulnerability, preparedness, and resilience of our communities. The methodological approaches are not fully developed, nor have researchers and practitioners come to any consensus on what to measure, how to measure, or how to weight those measures that are agreed upon. More funding is needed for research that can further these attempts and provide more models for discussion. Simpson (2001) 
